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c) He comments at length on the reasons for Thieu's victory, Dzu's strong showing, the failure of the civilian presidential and senatorial tickets, and the success of the Catholic tickets.

d) Lessons learned from the elections include:

I) The collapse of the legend of the traditional, virtuous spirit, which alleges that crooked, unvirtuous elements cannot be accepted or venerated. The collapse of the legend of the political importance of revolutionaries, moralists, and intellectuals.

II) The complex and disorderly situation resulting from the elections originated from the dishonest or at least superficial intentions of the authorities, including both the National Assembly and the Government.

III) The authorities wanted to build democracy, but they have done that in a sloppy and hasty manner.

IV) General Thieu got only about one-third of the votes. It was the first time the people could taste genuine democracy through criticism and insults of the candidates. They now realize that the authorities are not immune or invulnerable.

V) A people suffering from war and still having the courage to build democracy must have the right to live.

VI) The Communists, who pretend to be the sole representative of the people of South Viet-Nam, were not able to control at least 10 million people. (Sic; Tuyen must mean those who voted--about 4.8 million--plus their families.)

e) The elections are unlikely to bring big changes. The new regime is only a minority and therefore is fundamentally weak. However, between the GVN and the people, a contract has been signed. The Constitution, whether good or bad, must be observed. Both houses of the National Assembly will check on the Government, making it inefficient. The Senate doesn't look so good, and the Lower House certainly won't be any better.

f) National sovereignty depends on us. The U.S. does not intend to invade or colonize Viet-Nam. We must display initiative and an independent spirit but not depend entirely on others.

g) In spite of shortcomings in the elections, they open up a major prospect. Many people who formerly kept out of politics have now engaged themselves in it. The press is free. The Government has accepted criticism. If all that is not stopped, there will be a great prospect for a good future.

h) The problem of peace has been raised, based on the principle of self-determination, which everyone accepts. Despite further escalation of the war and an unchanged attitude in Hanoi, this is a step forward.

i) To permit the regime to survive and grow, the Government must make an effort to reconcile and unite all those who fight for the Nationalist cause.

j) This war is ours. We should take the initiative. We should have a general discussion with the U.S. to arrive at a policy and strategy on war, peace, aid, and reform.

Comment: The analysis speaks rather eloquently for itself. It is contradictory in spots, as Tuyen is torn between satisfaction at the advent of an elective government and disappointment that, so far, he has no place in it. It is a thought-provoking analysis, however, and is of particular interest as coming from a Vietnamese.

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Enclosure: [illegible]
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SUMMARY TRANSLATION

- REFLECTIONS OVER THE SEPTEMBER 3 ELECTIONS -

BY TRAN-VAN-TUYEN

(Published in Chinh Luan, September 16-17, 1967)

PART I : To-day.-

Successive showers and storms over the past few days have caused almost all the posters to fall off from the walls and the trunks of the trees. Some echo of the elections still resound in the press : thanks of the winners, protests of the losers etc.... But the majority of the people have almost forgotten the elections; they have forgotten that they had just chosen those who were going to rule over them, to decide on their behalf upon the destiny of the nation and also upon their own destiny.

Some foreigners, comparing the elections to a surgical operation over a serious case, said it was completed and well done. It's not quite right. We would call it a metamorphosis.

I.- Value of the elctions.-

I don't remember exactly how many nations sent their observers here and how many journalists were present during the elections, I only vaguely remember that the US officially sent a 22-man team, including Mr. Cabot Lodge, here to observe the elections and that control could be effected at a small number of places.

It was heard from Seoul, London, Taipei, Amsterdam, that elections were free, fair, honest. It was also heard from Hanoi, Peking, Moscow, and even at home here, that the elections were rigged. But there was one thing that no one could deny ; it was that the old junta was legitimatized, legalized, and made civilian.

Another apparent fact was that the work of developing democracy had been done in a sloppy and hasty manner ; The National Assembly had ended its discussion on the constitution hastily so that it could be taken to Guam; sloppiness and hastiness also appeared in the preparation of the election law, which covers the election day, the period of submission of records, the electoral campaign....

The same deficiencies were noted in the conduct of the elections by the authorities ; the public had not been prepared for the elections, no extensive indoctrination effort had been made, so that, in certain areas, the electoral campaign and the polling looked like buffooneries (five or six candidates met with around nine or ten voters, as at Phan-Van-Tri school; certain tickets took the money but didn't campaign).

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The majority of the people, who are suffering from the war, from terrorism, from expensive living, have accomplished courageously a duty. But let's not entertain the illusion that they trust in their action and in the promise of those who, although elected by them, consider them as strangers. Over the past thirteen years, they have been oppressed, disregarded, exploited, deceived. They are fed up with empty words, but, in the midst of the present chaotic situation, half a loaf is better than no bread.

We have a new regime, anyway.

For the past four years, we have been living in a chaotic situation because there has been no relationship between the government and the population. Now, we have got a contract between those who rule and those who are ruled. For the past four years, we have been living under an interim regime consisting of "crippled" or "abortive" organs; now, we've got a government which actually leads the nation. We have some freedom too. Thus, at least, we have a chance to "remake our life".

II.- Outcome of the elections.-

A.- The Truong-Dinh-Dzu phenomenon.-

Most surprising of all was the success of Truong-Dinh-Dzu. The press, referring to his poor personality and past activities, had predicted that he would certainly not enjoy the confidence of the public. Yet, he won as many as 800,000 votes, excelling even Phan-Khac-Suu and Tran-Van-Huong, the two most outstanding of the civilian candidates.

Indeed, Dzu's success was logical and could be anticipated, for the following reasons :

a) His "dove", which is an emblem of peace, fits the aspirations of the public. His promises to bring peace within six months, and to put an end to the saddening scenes of the arrest of young men on the streets for military service, were quite attractive.

b) He had the courage to criticize the regime, even to insult those in power (terming the man who called him crooked as ill-bred). It was the first time in history that people saw a "citizen" openly "insult" the government. That citizen spoke out the sentiments of indignation and hatred that had been harbored in their hearts through so many years of oppression. People cast their votes for the man who said what they wanted to say but dared not say it. Truong-Dinh-Dzu was that man.

c) For a certain number of voters, especially the women, Dzu had "good looks". He was a good talker too. Therefore, he succeeded in attracting the audience, those who didn't know his personality and back-ground.

d) Another psychological factor which contributed to Dzu's success was that the peasants believe that "wherever there are doves, there is rice". Thus, they "caught" the dove to seek good crops.

e) But most important of all was his sound campaigning plan and the means he utilized for the purpose. He had coordinated with about four or five senatorial tickets, all carrying the emblem of the dove. Just the money made available by the government to him and those tickets amounted up to 15 millions; another 20 millions had been contributed by those tickets themselves. In addition, they had support from the Tan Dai Viet Party whose most efficient members serve in the Army and other major branches of administration. For those reasons, there was nothing surprising in Dzu's success.

f) People also talked about support from the Communists. This support was obvious because the communists wanted the world to know that the people of South-Vietnam are eager for peace, and they always believe that the pressures of American and world opinion will constitute an important support to them.

The Communists' influence was evidenced by Dzu's success in Tay-Ninh, Hau-Nghia, Kien-Phong, which were insecure areas and where Communist influence was still strong.

g) People also talked about assistance from the CIA, but no evidence of it has been seen yet.

B.- Victory of Thieu and Ky.-

Very many people could predict this. 1) Everyone knows that, in any country, a candidate in power always has more advantage than any others :

a) Most of the people are conservative : they want to maintain those currently in power (unless they are too inefficient or too corrupt).

South-Vietnam has been living in an instable situation from 1963 to date. This regime has lasted rather long as compared to the previous ones. People don't like a military regime, but they are afraid that it would be rather hard for a civilian regime to stabilize the situation because the positions of province chief, district chiefs, and other key positions in economic and social agencies are being held by the military. A civilian regime could not work effectively without the support of the army. Moreover, some leaders of the army stated that they would topple any elected civilian regime if this would fail to follow the policy of the army. On the other hand, even the most influent candidates like Tran-Van-Huong and Phan-Khac-Suu had the chance to prove that they could not control the army and that, instead, were controlled by the army. Out of weariness, and out of fear of disturbances, people chose military candidates for the sake of their own security.

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It was the same state of mind that motivated their choice of Tran-Van-Don's and Huynh-Van-Cao's senatorial tickets.

b) Being in power, Thieu and Ky utilized many means which the other tickets could not afford, including personnel, transportation, money, visits, inspections, donations, promulgation of a statute for the Montagnards etc...

c) Public servants who sought credit devoted themselves to the service of Thieu and Ky, whether requested or not to do so. Servicemen, of course, had affection for their comrades-at-arms, and believed that a military government would be more thoughtful of them than any civilian regime. 2) Disunity among civilian tickets caused a split of their votes to the benefit of their military adversaries. 3) Although Thieu-Ky won, one could note that the percentage of votes they obtained was very low (only 33% or 1,600,000 votes). This was only 1/10 of the total population of South-Vietnam which totals 16 millions, or 1/6 of the voting population. Anyhow, it corresponded to only 1/3 of the population controlled by the GVN. This fact means that the other 2/3 didn't support the junta. It should also be mentioned that people in Saigon, Hue, Da-Nang, which were secure cities, didn't strongly support Thieu and Ky, as they had been expected to do. Although it's true that Hue and Da-Nang had not forgotten the Buddhist issue yet, in Saigon and Cholon Tran-Van-Huong defeated Thieu and Ky. The same thing happened among the Chinese and Cao Dai communities. Indeed, Thieu-Ky's failure was partly due to their little campaigning and (more important still) to their internal conflicts.

C.- Victory of the Peasant-Worker-Military (ticket of Tran-Van-Don in the Senate election): This ticket was leading in many provinces. There were several reasons for their success :

a) First of all, the ticket includes two outstanding personalities, General Don and General Dinh, both given credit for the November 1 revolution of 1963 and both victims of Khanh's coup in January 1964. For both of them, just as for Duong-Van-Minh, public affection is still deep, since the Vietnamese always maintain affection for those who have done something for them yet haven't received anything in return. It was speculated also that had Big Minh been authorized to run, Thieu - Ky would not have won. By voting for Don and Dinh, people wanted to make up for the injustices they have suffered for the past three years. By voting for them, the people's intention was also "to set generals against generals", thus to counterbalance the influence of Thieu-Ky.

b) The personnel (servicemen and veterans) and financial means utilized by the ticket were rather abundant.

c) The ticket was well composed, therefore it was supported by part of the Cao-Dai sect, the Hoa-Hao, the Buddhists, and the CVT.

d) The ticket also included Dr. Dang-Van-Sung, a key politician and journalist, one of the leaders of the Dai Viet Party and also editor of daily Chinh-Luan.

D.- Failure of the civilian presidential and senatorial tickets.-

Contrary to the expectation of many people, Huong and Suu were defeated right in their native areas; Nguyen-Hoa-Hiep, Vu-Hong-Khanh (leaders of the Vietnam Quoc-Dan-Dang), and Ha-Thuc-Ky (leader of the Dai-Viet) obtained less votes than independent candidates like Dzu, Suu and Huong; Senatorial tickets headed by politicians or intellectuals like Tran-Van-Do, Vu-Quoc-Thuc etc... lost the elections.

Their failure is not surprising because the parties' organizations didn't spread widely and penetrate deeply in the masses and also because their means were limited.

Independent civilian tickets were weaker and poorer still. They were known only among the intellectual and political circles but not in the far-off areas. This was not their fault, however, since, so far, in Vietnam, there haven't been political activities in the masses which would permit those candidates to get in touch with the populace. Even during the elections they weren't given many chances to meet them.

4.- Success of Catholic tickets.-

It was noted that, out of six tickets which won the senatorial elections, three were headed by the Catholics and consisted mostly of Catholics. Another, that of Tran-Van-Lam, could have been added. *Through the number of votes which those tickets obtained, one could see that the voters were following a certain discipline; the glorious success of the Catholics was not surprising because the Catholic community is one which has the soundest organisation system in the country, not only from the religious point of view but also from the political of view.

III.- Meaning of the elections.-

Several different meanings were given the elections by different people :

1) Some pretended that it was a "stage-setting" aimed at :

a) Providing the GVN with a legal foundation.

b) Showing to the world, especially the American people, that the situation of Vietnam had improved.

c) Laying a new basis for the new policy of the U.S. to move toward peace.

2) Others pretended to perceive the attitude of the people toward war and peace through the returns of the elections, comparing the complete failure of Pham-Huy-Co (who advocated that American troops should stay in Vietnam and that

*NB. This was written before the Central Elections Commission, on September 18, declared Tran-Van-Lam's list elected.

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more of them should be sent here) to the success of Truong-Dinh-Dzu (who advocated peace). They conclude that it was the most tangible proof of the South-Vietnamese's thirst of peace and opposition to war.

3) Others said the election was a vote of non-confidence in the present regime because Thieu - Ky won only 1/3 of the total votes, and that this means that people wanted to see another regime with other men.

4) According to others, the elections indicated the collapse of moral values, and the appearance of revolutionary political and intellectual qualities.

The past achievements of party leaders, revolutionists, politicians, and the diplomas of intellectuals had lost their value in the political arena of a troubled country and in the elections.

5) Others still considered the elections as meaningless because there were the same people, the same spirit, the same policy, the same conduct, and because the new regime would only be a new cloak covering up an old regime.

Those five opinions expressed the same fact that was viewed from different angles and sometimes in a biased manner.

Based upon those opinions, we are going to draw some practical lessons.

IV.- Lessons learned.-

The returns of the elections and the opening of a new episode of history require the responsible authorities, the revolutionaries, politicians, and all national combattants, to re-examine all the national problems and to redefine their attitudes, policies, plans, tactics, and strategies, in order to face the situation effectively and to prevent "dog-and-horse" elements and "flatterers" from ruling over the people and leading the nation to total destruction.

1) First lesson.-

One could witness the collapse of certain legends :

- The legend of the traditional, virtuous spirit which alleges that crooked and unvirtuous elements cannot be accepted or venerated.

- The legend of the political value of revolutionaries, moralists, and intellectuals, and the legend that a number of religious, political, and military groups and forces are highly significant.

One could see that a man like Truong-Dinh-Dzu excelled by far Tran-Van-Huong and Phan-Khac-Suu, who were considered as serious and honest, and the leaders of revolutionary groups and political parties who had achieved numerous deeds.

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One could see that revolutionary and political groups were inefficient and disintegrated because of their loose organization and discipline.

One could also see that the effect of a political struggle no longer depends on empty promises, glamorous speeches, past achievements, or on diplomas or moral qualities, but rather on the techniques of organisation and propaganda, and on the physical means used among the masses. This is what the national leaders have overlooked in the past; therefore, they have not been able to motivate the masses and to defeat the communists. In this respect, the Catholic community should be considered as a bright example to all other communities.

2) Second lesson.-

The complex and disorderly situation resulting from the elections originated from the dishonest or, at least, the selfish and superficial intentions of the responsible authorities. These fabricated a Legislative Assembly, which does not look so good, by means of an electoral law and an election which does not look so good, either. That Assembly created a constitution which was not very practical; the Assembly worked out, along with the government, a disastrous election law.

As a result, a President was created who represents only a minority of people, with only 33% of the votes (28% of the total registered voting strength), a "hodgepodge" and incompetent Senate which also represents only a minority. This is the very source of trouble in the future. All that was merely because the government wanted to have a Constituent Assembly which would submit itself to it, an election which would legalize it, and senators who would serve its interests. It was also because the Constituent Assembly which wanted to establish future Houses for itself, and to prepare an election law which would be to the benefit of its members.

The circumstances didn't lead those "sorcerers" to their selfish objectives. They had forgotten that their positions and interests are secure only when those interests are assimilated to those of the nation.

3) Third lesson.-

As a rule, once engaged in major tasks, one must study plans, strategies, and tactics carefully before acting.

Everyone knows that, once engaged in politics, one must anticipate; yet, so far, everything has been done on the spur of the moment without any careful consideration of the consequences.

They wanted to build democracy, and they have done that in a sloppy and hasty manner. But they forgot that Vietnam is just like a patient whose condition has come to serious stage and that, therefore, treatment should be skillful. The Vietnamese are really hungry and thirsty for freedom and democracy,

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but, just like serious patients, they are too weak, they should not be forced to move too quickly, lest they not survive long.

4) Fourth lesson.-

Those in power are often subjectivist : they only see the good part of the work they have done but not the bad part of it. The recent elections gave the candidates in power only 1/3 of the votes. They were defeated in many areas, and it should be noted that the 600,000 military voters and their families did not vote only for their generals, and that the majority of the Vietnamese of Chinese extraction did not vote for them either, in spite of their promise to give back millions of piasters worth of properties to the Chinese congregations. The same was true among the Cao-Dai in Tay-Ninh who had received land from the government, and the populations of Hue, Danang, and Saigon, who expressed non-confidence in the regime.

General Thieu had modestly estimated that he could win 40% of the votes, yet the actual number of votes that went to him was far inferior to that modest figure. This is tantamount to a warning to the newly elected President who should meditate over his past work and plan for changes in the future.

It should not be forgotten that, during the elections, it was the first time that people could taste genuine democracy through the criticism and insults of the candidates, and that they have now realized that the authorities are not immune or invulnerable. This is an important fact that the authorities should remember.

5) Fifth lesson.-

Foreign observers and journalists only saw the outward appearance of the elections. This lesson deals with that outward appearance. I am not discussing the tricks and schemes used to rig the elections. I am only talking about the courageous and devoted attitude of the voters, especially those who live in insecure areas. These went to the polls, in defiance of the threat of the VC. I am also praising the immense devotion of the troops and police, who succeeded in maintaining security and countering VC schemes of sabotage. From those facts, I expect the foreigners to draw these two conclusions : 1) A people who suffers from the war and who, at the same time, builds democracy with so much courage, must have the right to live.

2) The communists, who pretended to be the only representative of the population in South-Vietnam, were not able to control at least ten million people.

PART II : The future.-

Right now, we can say that those who expect to see through the elections a change in the situation will be disappointed. The returns of the elections

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cannot make us confident in the future; on the contrary, they make us afraid that much trouble will happen in the days to come.

Any hope of stability ?

Any hope of determination of national sovereignty ?

Any hope of development of democracy ?

Any hope of victory over the Communists or national reconciliation ?

I'm afraid not.

I have been through many decisive moments of national history, yet I have never been so anxious as at this time.

1) Any hope to stabilize the situation in the future ?

Although elected by the people, the new regime represents only a minority; therefore, it's a weak regime.

How can it have enough prestige vis-a-vis the population ?

How can it have enough prestige vis-a-vis the opposition camp ?

How can it have enough prestige vis-a-vis the Communists ?

How can it have enough prestige vis-a-vis the national problem ?

There remain the same men, the same difficulties, plus those added by the elections.

Before, the government was depending on the Army to move heaven and earth. Now, between the government and the people, a contract has been signed. The constitution, whether good or bad, must be observed. Legislative organs will be established. With extensive power, both Houses will control the government, making it inefficient.

The newly elected Upper House doesn't look so good. The Lower House certainly won't be any better. We could see the disorderly spectacle of Constituent Assembly which was irresponsible, demagogic, disregarded or bribed and spoilt by the government.

There will certainly be an opposition bloc inside the National Assembly.

There will also be an opposition bloc outside of it. This bloc will create considerable difficulties to the government since it will consist of Buddhists and thousands of those who voted for losing candidates in the presidential, Upper House, and Lower House elections.

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A situation will happen like the one in July and August, 1963. The only difference is that the government is weaker and the opposition stronger. One could already see the reactions of the losing candidates, the students, the Buddhists, and the press, and above all, the conflict between the President-elect and the Vice-President elect, a conflict which further weakens an already weak regime.

2) Any hope of consolidating sovereignty in the future ?

People in South-Vietnam are very sensitive about sovereignty since they feel that so far there have been the mere objects of the policies of the French then the Americans.

Before the elections, there were warnings and threats from American Officials and congressmen against rigged elections. After the elections, praises were heard, followed by expressions of indignation against criticism, then by statements regarding a coalition regime, a pacification program, apprehension of 5000 most important terrorists, establishment of more tribunals, assignment of more magistrates to try suspects, construction of more prisons etc...

The USSR and Red China gave to the DRV and the NLF billions of dollars, but they are more discreet. Informed people wouldn't think the US wants to interfere with the sovereignty of Vietnam, but what would the man on the street, who is affected by the Communists' tricky propaganda, say about those naive and dangerous statements ?

Anyway, sovereignty depends on us. The US does not have any intention to invade or colonize this country. No one can force us to submit the constitution to the US before promulgating it, and to accept an aid policy which we consider as inappropriate.

We must display initiative and an independent spirit, but not depend entirely on others.

3) Any hope of developing democracy in the future ?

It's the second time that the people of South-Vietnam build a Republican regime. Thirteen years ago, the work was done with hope and enthusiasm. But, no one shows enthusiasm this time because the people, who have been deceived, have lost part of their confidence in the democratic cause. Moreover, the path which leads to democracy begins with anti-democratic actions (electoral law, electoral campaign, rejection of Duong-Van-Minh's and Au-Truong-Thanh's candidacies) and ends with a lottery.

In spite of all that, there is a big prospect : many people who have kept out of politics have now engaged themselves in it. The public, although confused in the midst of the chaos, has begun to realize what democracy is. Contrary to what happened in some countries where candidates and their men sought to destroy one another, candidates here insulted one another, but it was not so serious. This constitutes another hope, and one can see that there begins to be

some political activity.

The press has become free. The constitution has provided for lifting of censorship. The government has accepted criticism. If all that is not stopped, there will be a great prospec for a good future.

4) Any hope of settling the war in the future ?

No one still entertains the illusion of annihilating the Communists or forcing them to surrender. One only hopes that a popularly-elected regime will be able to replace the US in opening talks with Hanoi. The President-elect stated he was ready to meet with Ho-Chi-Minh; the US also said she would not prevent Saigon and Hanoi from talking directly with each other. However, one could note that the basic policy of the allies remained unchanged : the war continues to escalate, a barrier is going to be set up along the DMZ, Australia has sent in more warships, the ROK is expected to bring here 17,000 veterans (sic), American troops continue to land in Vietnam, the Vietnamese generals are proceeding with the reorganisation of the army.

But this time it is accepted that Hanoi and Saigon should talk with each other without the presence of any alien; there's some intention to accept the NLF as a political party; and it's also made clear that the US is ready to withdraw its troops and to remove its bases so that the North and the South could discuss the problem of reunification.

This is an important turn of events, as compared to last year. Peace will certainly be talked about in the days to come. But the question is how to achieve peace so that it will not tantamount to "turning oneself" over to the Communists. Is the other side ready ? Pham-Van-Dong's conditions for negotiation, his denial of the returns of the elections in South-Vietnam, his claim that the NLF should be the only representative of South-Vietnam, and his approval of the new NLF program indicate that Hanoi's attitude remains unchanged. Anyhow, the problem of peace has been raised, based upon the principle of self-determination which everyone accepts. This is a step forward.

CONCLUSION : What must be done ?

I wouldn't be optimistic like those who pretend that if we have an Assembly, we can have democracy and if we have a popularly-elected regime, we can have peace. Democracy and peace require a great many other conditions. I wouldn't be pessimistic either, like those who think this is the "last chance" for the nationalists, But I am anxious to note that the Second Republic is deficient at its very beginning and that its existence is seriously threatened at its very birth. There are exceptions, however : for instance, the Third Republic of France was born with a one-vote plurality, yet it lasted 60 years.

To permit the regime to survive and to grow, the first thing the government should do is to create a new struggle position, beginning with an effort to

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reconcile and unite all those who fight for the national cause, those who possess political skills and experiences, without any discrimination whatsoever. It should also establish a concrete national policy, select qualified people who are determined to change completely the old and rotten systems. The National Assembly should clear-mindedly formulate policies for the government. It should be realistic, and not demagogic. Both the government and the Assembly should seek cooperation of skilled and virtuous specialists. Politicians outside the government and the Assembly should realize the requirements of the new situation; should brush aside all conflicts and suspicious among them, tighten their ranks, and assemble into a solid unit governed by strict discipline and definite policies, so as to be able to organize the masses and to rally them into political struggle forces. In this connection, the government should assist, but not bribe, the various groups and communities. The press is expected to play an important role in guiding public opinion and indoctrinating the masses.

Diem's basic mistake consists in his failure to unite national forces. During the electoral campaign, General Thieu mentioned a policy of national union. The time has come for him to carry it out. It's the primary condition for success in any undertaking.

The second most important thing is our attitude toward our allies. This war is ours. So far, we have been depending too much on others; it's why there have been so many complaints about violation of national sovereignty.

We should take the initiative. First of all, there should be a general discussion between our government and the US government to arrive at a policy and a strategy concerning war, peace, aid, reform.

The new play has just begun. Somebody called it a "tragicomedy". I would say it's more "tragic" than "comic". I only see the pains, difficulties, courage, sacrifices of a people which is trying to get out of the bog, to clear its way through fire and smoke in search of freedom.

The years of 1945, 1953, 1963 marked more failure than success. It is hoped that the lessons drawn from those years and from the recent elections will help us avoid errors and move toward real peace, democracy, and freedom.

THE END

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